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NOTES AND COMMENTS
LABOR INJUNCTIONS AND JUDGE-MADE LABOR LAW:
THE CONTEMPORARY ROLE OF NORRIS-LAGUARDIA*
SUBSTANTIAL changes in federal labor policy since the passage of the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act 1 in 1932 cast doubt upon the continued vitality of that
statute and its underlying policies. Although narrowly framed as a limitation
upon the power of federal courts to issue labor injunctions, Norris-LaGuardia
represents a far broader policy of circumscribing the judiciary's role in regu-
lating labor-management disputes. But with the enactment of the amended
Railway Labor Act in 1934,2 the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,3 and
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,4 congressional policy appears to have disre-
garded these aims, since the regulatory framework created under the new acts
assigns far-reaching adjudicatory and enforcement responsibilities to the fed-
eral courts. Effective enforcement of these later statutes may require the use
of injunctive relief in situations where Norris-LaGuardia explicitly prohibits
it. Moreover, the presence of unforeseen conflicts or omissions in later statutes
may lead courts, now closely associated with the enforcement process, to re-
assume policy-making functions which Norris-LaGuardia sought to abolish.
Similarly, courts enforcing statutes such as the antitrust laws whose regula-
tory sphere overlaps with the area of labor management relations may attempt
to engage in this prohibited formulation of labor policy.
This Comment will attempt to determine the extent to which Norris-La-
Guardia has been rendered inoperative by subsequent federal legislation. A
prerequisite for measuring the actual degree of conflict is an understanding of
the full range of Norris-LaGuardia's policies and the evils it was intended to
correct. This analysis will lay the groundwork for analyzing the conflict be-
tween Norris-LaGuardia and other apparently inconsistent statutes. Where
conflicting policies seem to require the courts to override Norris-LaGuardia
in a particular case, the reasons for that decision will be examined carefully
in order to determine whether similar conflicts with other statutes will in fact
require the same disposition.
*An earlier version of this Comment was submitted in satisfaction of the writing require-
ment of the Yale Law School's Divisional Program, Labor Law Division, 1959-1960. The
Law Journal wishes to thank Professors Clyde W. Summers and Harry H. Wellington for
bringing this paper to the Editors' attention.
1. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958).
2. 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1958).
3. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1958).
4. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-87 (1958).
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THE NoRRis-LAGuARDIA AcT
The Norris-LaGuardia Act embodies policies designed to effect profound
changes in the role of the federal government and federal institutions in the
regulation of labor disputes. Prior to 1932, federal courts had jurisdiction,
mainly in diversity and Sherman Act cases, 5 over a broad range of union
activities. Acting without legislative guides, federal judges were inclined to
decide labor controversies according to their own predominantly conservative
social and political views, and rendered decisions which were generally hostile
to the union's use of economic power.6 Under the prima facie tort doctrine,
an intentional injury inflicted through the use of economic pressure was un-
lawful unless a court found it justified by the self-interest of the defendant
union.7 Moreover, even if the objectives were found to be legitimate, economic
pressure could be exerted only through means receiving judicial approbation.8
The imprecise terms of the Sherman Act furnished another vehicle for re-
straining union activity, since "restraint of trade" could be found in almost
any effective use of economic pressure.9 Both the tort and Sherman Act doc-
trines were used to prohibit activities such as secondary boycotts, 10 recognition
strikes," make-work practices,' 2 and picketing.'3 Attempts to organize non-
union employees were brought within the tort of interference with beneficial
contractual relations by judicial protection of the "yellow dog" contract-the
5. Federal courts regulated labor disputes under three heads of original jurisdiction.
The first was diversity of citizenship between the opposing parties, under 36 Stat. 1091
(1911), now 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958). Before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
federal courts were free to fashion the law applicable to these suits.
The second head was federal question jurisdiction over suits for injunctions under § 16
of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958), against violations of the
Sherman Anti-trust Law, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 10 (1958).
Federal courts also exercised jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting interstate com-
merce and the statutes pertaining thereto. See, e.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
For a full discussion of federal jurisdiction over labor disputes, see generally FRANK-
FURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION 5-17 (1930) [hereinafter cited as FRANKFURTER
& GREENE].
6. See WrrTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES 12-45 (1932) [hereinafter cited
as WITTE] ; FRANKFURTER & GREENE 1-46.
7. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). See also Holmes,
Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 H. v. L. REv. 1 (1894).
8. See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184 (1921) ; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582, 584 (S.D. Iowa 1905) (no such
thing as "peaceful picketing") ; Levy & Devaney, Inc. v. International Pocketbook Workers
Union, 114 Conn. 319, 158 Ati. 795 (1932).
9. See notes 97-102 infra and accompanying text.
10. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) ; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S.
274 (1908).
11. Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F.2d 203 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
12. United States v. Painters Dist. Council, 44 F.2d 58 (N.D. Ill. 1930), aff'd, 284
U.S. 582 (1931) ; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (8th Cir. 1897).
13. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
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employee's promise not to join a union, extracted as a condition of employ-
ment.14 Thus, through this often amorphous body of law, the courts them-
selves undertook to define the "area of allowable economic conflict."'1
The foundation of this judicial regulation was the labor injunction. Dam-
age suits had proved unsatisfactory to employers seeking relief against illegal
union activities."0 Unions were often judgment-proof ;1' there were procedural
difficulties in suing labor organizations as entities ;18 juries were available to
the defendant unions ;19 and such actions rarely provided relief until long after
the dispute was over.20 The injunction, however, did not suffer from these
handicaps and provided relatively swift and comprehensive relief. A temporary
restraining order against the union could be obtained within a matter of
hours.21 Because decrees often enjoined a broad class of persons 22 and a wide
range of activities, including even peaceful persuasion and leaving the job,2
these prohibitory clauses served as a vehicle for detailed judicial policing of
14. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) ; UMW v. Red Jacket
Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927). Any employer willing to compel
employee acquiescence could effectively foreclose all union organizational efforts directed
at his business. See WiTrE 220-30.
15. Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 412, 182 N.E. 63, 66 (1932) (Pound,
CJ.).
16. Before 1928 only one damage suit brought against a union under the Sherman Act
resulted in a substantial monetary award, while 52% of the criminal prosecutions brought
by the government resulted in convictions, and private suits for injunctions brought under
§ 16 of the Clayton Act were successful in 71% of the cases. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE
SHERMAN Acr 212-15 (1930).
17. See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 94-95 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
18. See WiTTE 141-44.
19. See BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 217; GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 95 (2d
rev. ed. 1958).
20. BERMAN, op. cit. vipra note 16, at 215-17.
21. See WiTTE 90.
22. See, e.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 570 (1895) ("all .. .persons whomsoever").
See generally FRANKFURTER & GREENE 86-89; WiTrE 96.
23. For injunction of peaceful persuasion, see United States v. Railway Employees'
Dept., 283 Fed. 479 (N.D. Ill. 1922) (decree printed in Hearings Before the Senate Comn-
inittee on the Judiciary on Limiting the Scope of Injunctions in Labor Disputes, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1928) [hereinafter cited as 1928 Hearings]. See also Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
For injunctions prohibiting leaving the job, see Western Union Tel. v. Local 134, IBEW,
2 F.2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 1924), aff'd, 6 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1925) (decree printed in 1928 Hear-
ings 112). For other kinds of activity enjoined, see United States v. Railway Employees'
Dep't, 283 Fed. 479 (N.D. Ill. 1922) (enjoining payment of strike benefits) (decree printed
in 1928 Hearings 113) ; Clarkson Coal Mining Co. v. UMW, (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1927) (re-
quiring that all pickets be able to speak the English language) (unreported, decree printed
in 1928 Hearings 553-56) ; UMW v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839
(4th Cir. 1927) (enjoining use of union funds to help strikers fight eviction from company
houses); Clarkson Coal Mining Co. v. UMW, 23 F.2d 208 (S.D. Ohio 1927) (enjoining
strikers from living in company houses). See generally FRANKFURTER & GREENE 89-105;
WrrTE 97-99.
[Vol. 70: 70
HeinOnline -- 70 Yale L.J. 72 1960-1961
LABOR INJUNCTIONS
labor disputes. Moreover, violators of the order might be subject to criminal
and civil contempt proceedings held without a jury and before the same judge
who had issued the original decree.
24
The initial stages of the injunctive process were particularly subject to pro-
cedural inadequacies and substantive error. Since to be effective the temporary
injunction had to be issued swiftly, the trial judge's decision was made hastily
in an atmosphere often highly-charged with emotion. The amorphous charac-
ter of the substantive law also contributed to the possibility of error, as did
the inadequacy of evidence before the judge.25 To achieve speed, temporary
restraining orders were issued ex parte upon the filing of standardized form-
book complaints, 2 and, at the preliminary hearing, temporary injunctions
were often issued solely on the basis of slanted, vague affidavits, whose alle-
gations were safe from cross-examination.2 7 Errors made in the early stages
of the proceedings could, in theory, be corrected by the subsequent full dress
trial necessary to the issuance of a permanent injunction, or on appeal. In
practice, however, such corrective action would be ineffective, for such pro-
ceedings ordinarily came too late to repair the damage to the union. Rather
than maintaining the status quo, the temporary injunction usually effected a
final settlement of the dispute, for even a brief interruption of the strike could
break union morale and hold the union's economic power in check while the
employer was free to retaliate.28 The finality of this remedy was demonstrated
by the relative infrequency with which employers sought permanent injunc-
tions.2 0
The Norris-LaGuardia Act can be viewed as a three-pronged attack on
judge-made labor law and its administration. First, the act rejected the in-
junction as a remedy in labor disputes. Second, it declared that federal courts
were not the proper agency of the government to formulate substantive labor
policy. Third, it repudiated the federal common law of labor relations and
established a policy of governmental neutrality in labor disputes as a means
of aiding the growth of organized labor.30 Although the act's policy of govern-
24. E.g., United States v. Taliaferro, 290 Fed. 906 (4th Cir. 1923) (criminal con-
tempt) ; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (civil contempt) ; see
WnrEF 100-01.
25. FRANKFURTER & GREENE 79-80, 200-02.
26. Id. at 63-64. Of the 118 labor injunction cases reported in the federal courts from
1901-1928, 70 ex parte orders were issued. Id. at 64.
27. Id. at 66-81. However, lower court judges could at their discretion require oral
testimony subject to cross-examination. See Great No. Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414 (D.
N.D. 1923).
28. See Wrrz 121; FRANKFURTER & GREENE 201.
29. Of the 88 temporary injunctions reported from 1901-1928, only 32 reached the per-
manent injunction stage. Id. at 79, Appendix II.
30. During the debates on Norris-LaGuardia, Senator Wagner remarked:
The policy and purpose which give meaning to the present legislation is its im-
plicit declaration that the government shall occupy a neutral position, lending its
1960]
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mental neutrality has given way to pervasive federal regulation, its remedial
proscriptions and strictures on the role of the judiciary remain fundamental
to the scheme of federal labor law.
The view that injunctions per se are an inappropriate remedy in labor dis-
putes is reflected in the broad and unequivocal prohibitions imposed by the
act. Federal courts are denied all power to issue both temporary and perma-
nent injunctions in nonviolent labor disputes. 31 In addition to this general
statement, section 4 of the act explicitly immunizes specific activities such as
refusal to work, picketing, and payment of strike benefits.32 No distinction is
drawn between "lawful" and "unlawful" nonviolent activities ;3 the act ren-
ders federal judges powerless even to enjoin action prohibited by substantive
law. Moreover, in the limited area where injunctions are permitted in order to
prevent violence, the act prescribes detailed procedures which the court must
follow. Under section 7,34 no temporary or permanent injunction may be is-
sued unless supported by oral testimony subject to cross-examination. Further-
more, ex parte orders are available only if necessary to prevent injury to prop-
erty and lapse after five days. In addition, section 11 35 grants a jury trial to
persons charged with contempt for violations of orders issued under the act.
Withdrawal of the injunctive power not only abolished the use of a par-
ticular remedy-it also put federal courts out of the business of making labor
policy. Shorn of their only meaningful enforcement powers, federal courts
were no longer looked to by litigants as an effective check upon economic
coercion.36 The legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia indicates that the Con-
gress intended this result, believing that institutionally courts were ill-suited
to make policy in labor matters. Excessive intervention in labor strife had
extraordinary power neither to those who would have labor unorganized nor to those
who would organize it and limiting its action to the preservation of order and the
restraint of fraud.
75 CONG. Rxc. 4915 (1932). This policy is reflected in § 2 of Norris-LaGuardia, 47 Stat.
70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
31. The only exception to the broad prohibition, "[N]o court of the United States...
shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . injunction in a . . . labor dispute," 47 Stat. 70
(1932), 29 U.S.C. 101 (1958), is in § 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. 107 (1958). But
since § 7 requires a finding that public officers cannot protect complainant's property, the
exception seems inapplicable to situations not involving violent conduct. See note 33 infra.
32. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. 104 (1958).
33. Local 753, Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods, Inc., 311
U.S. 91 (1940); Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 27 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 105 F.2d 948
(3d Cir. 1939).
[T]he words "unlawful acts" in section 7(a) . . . do not constitute a reference
to anything that may be considered illegal, but specifically to the acts of violence
which the authority of the executive is calculated to control.
105 F.2d at 952.
34. 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
35. 47 Stat. 72 (1932), 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1958).
36. See S. Doc. No. 7, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1951).
[Vol. 70: 70
HeinOnline -- 70 Yale L.J. 74 1960-1961
LABOR INJUNCTIONS
tarnished the prestige of the federal courts.37 Entanglement in a struggle be-
tween opposing economic classes had destroyed the aura of impartiality essen-
tial to a rule of law and had made judges and judicial decisions in this area
the center of political debate. 38 This loss of prestige, moreover, was the un-
avoidable result of judicial interference in labor disputes, for such intervention
leads to the assumption of partisan positions. While courts making law in
areas such as tort or contract may draw upon generally accepted values, there
are few such shared principles in the field of labor relations. Every decision
tended to be a political statement, favoring one camp or the other.39 By im-
mobilizing the judiciary, the act attempted to remove courts from this political
stage, leaving the controversial task of formulating labor policy to a more
appropriate political institution-the Congress itself.
40
37. The Senate report observed:
It cannot be successfully claimed that the courts have not written into these in-
junction cases a new law of labor disputes, fitting the law to each particular case, and
then enforcing this new law made by the court....
It is difficult to see how any civilized people could indefinitely submit to such
tyrannical procedure. It is not difficult to understand how such cruel laws, made not
by any legislature but by a judge upon the bench, should bring our Federal courts
into disrepute.
S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1932).
This judge-made law has developed in the past 40 years. The judges have them-
selves enforced the penalties for the violations of the laws made by the..... It is
because of this development of law made on the bench that our federal courts have
lost a great deal of respect.
75 CoNG. REc. 5463 (1932) (remarks of Representative O'Connor). See also, WITT. 131
("The most important aspect of the reaction of labor injunctions upon the courts is their
weakened prestige.").
38. In both Houses of Congress the debate over the passage of Norris-LaGuardia
focused on the role of the courts. Senator Norris observed:
[I]t is because we have now on the bench some judges-and undoubtedly we will
have others-who lack that judicial poise necessary in passing upon the disputes be-
tween labor and capital that such a law as is proposed in this bill is necessary.
75 CONG. REc. 4510 (1932). See also id. at 5478 (remarks of Representative LaGuardia).
One appointee to the Supreme Court was denied confirmation by the Senate in 1930 princi-
pally because of his injunction record. WrrTE 127-28. Representative LaGuardia observed
that the injunction had been used "to break a strike; to take one side of an issue; to deter-
mine wages and standards of living by the brute force of judicial power-instead of leaving
it to a matter of adjustment by free American workers." 75 CONG. REc. 5480 (1932).
39. See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 83-88 (2d rev. ed., 1958).
40. See Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 370 n.7 (1960) (Norris-La-
Guardia "was prompted by a desire... to withdraw federal courts from a type of contro-
versy for which many believed they were ill-suited and from participation in which, it was
feared, judicial prestige might suffer").
The legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia is replete with statements which support
the Supreme Court's interpretation:
We are trying to reestablish a system of laws for the government of the courts.
We are writing a law binding the courts to a definite course of action with reference
19601
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Interpretation of Norris-LaGuardia as a broad prohibition on judicial for-
mulation of labor policy finds support in specific provisions of the statute. The
act outlaws both permanent and temporary injunctions, although the perma-
nent injunction suffered from none of the procedural flaws which marred the
temporary decree.4 1 And section 13, defining the term "labor dispute" in ex-
ceedingly broad terms,42 radically changed the role of the courts in analyzing
labor cases. While older theories, such as the prima facie tort doctrine, had
required courts to determine the extent to which a union's self-interest justi-
fied coercive action,43 judicial inquiry under Norris-LaGuardia is limited to
the narrow question of whether the union has such an interest in the dispute. 44
Moreover, the broad prohibitions of the act, encompassing almost all labor-
management controversies and ignoring all distinctions betveen lawful and
unlawful peaceful activity, indicate congressional fear of judicially created
exceptions 45 and a desire to limit judicial discretion in applying the act.
NORRIs-LAGUARDIA AND THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The Norris-LaGuardia prohibition against labor injunctions first came into
conflict with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act,46 passed in 1926 and
substantially amended in 1934. Although the RLA establishes substantive
rights and duties which require judicial enforcement, the draftsmen of the
to injunctions. We are not disturbing the government of laws but we are taking
away from the courts their right to act as if they were a government of men.
75 CONG. REc. 4509 (1932) (Representative Oliver).
The public policy laid down in the bill, I think, is essential, because there should
be some standard by which the courts may know, at a time when they are in such
confusion, what it is proper to do. I think the most fitting and, in reality, the only
proper tribunal to express such a policy is the Congress.
Id. at 5470 (Representative Browning).
41. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
42. [A]ny controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating. . . or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958).
43. See note 7 supra.
44. See Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960) ; Local 33, Bakery
Sales Drivers v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948) ; Local 753, Milk Wagon Drivers v. Lake
Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938); Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. Clayton, 228 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1956) ; Diamond Full Fashioned Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
20 F. Supp. 467 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
45. The House Report described the broad provisions of § 13 as necessary "in order
that the limitation may not be whittled away by refined definitions of what persons are to
be regarded as legitimately involved in labor disputes ... .' H. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1932). See also 75 CoNG. REc. 4510 (1932) (Senator Norris) ; id. at 4774-78
(same).
46. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1958).
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1934 amendments gave no indication of the extent to which the anti-injunction
statute would limit the remedial power of courts in RLA cases. In some cases,
injunctive relief may be necessary to enforce these rights and duties. If Nor-
ris-LaGuardia were held to prohibit injunctions in all railway labor disputes,
therefore, some policies of the RLA must be subordinated to the policy of the
anti-injunction statute.
The Railway Labor Act regulates collective bargaining on the railroads and
airlines. Like the National Labor Relations Act, it guarantees the right to
organize 47 and establishes an employer duty to recognize and bargain with the
majority union ;48 unlike the NLRA, the RLA does not create an agency
empowered to guarantee these rights, but leaves their enforcement to the
courts. 49 Nor does the RLA place express limitations on union use of eco-
nomic force or regulate the parties by a detailed system of unfair labor prac-
tices. Certain responsibilities, however, are entrusted to two agencies, the Na-
tional Railway Adjustment Board (NRAB) and the National Mediation Board
(NMB).r' Their functions are divided along lines corresponding to the statu-
tory distinction between so-called "minor" disputes-grievances involving the
interpretation or application of existing collective agreements-and "major"
disputes-controversies over the negotiation of terms for future agreements. 5'
The NRAB is empowered to render a "final and binding" decision over a
"minor" dispute; arbitration of such grievances is compulsory upon submis-
sion by either party. 52 The resolution of "major" disputes, on the other hand,
is left to free collective bargaining and the use of economic force, subject only
to certain procedural requirements. The power of the NMB in these disputes
is limited to mediation.
5 3
47. Section 2 Fourth, as amended, 48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth
(1958). The corresponding NLRA provision is § 7, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
48. Section 2 Ninth, 48 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth (1952), correspond-
ing to NLRA § 8(a) (5), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958).
49. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas & N.O.R.R.
v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
50. Section 3, as amended, 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1958) establishes
and defines the jurisdiction of the NRAB. Section 4, as amended, 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), 45
U.S.C. § 154 (1958) establishes the NMB while § 5, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195 (1934), 45
U.S.C. § 155 (1958) defines its functions.
51. For a discussion of this jurisdictional bifurcation, see Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley,
325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945).
52. See Railway Labor Act § 3(i) & (m), as amended, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45
U.S.C. § 153(i) & (m) (1958) ; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
53. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (refus-
ing to enjoin a strike over a major dispute).
The RLA contains several provisions designed to maintain the status quo during the
early stages of a major dispute. Railway Labor Act § 6, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934),
45 U.S.C. § 156 (1958), provides that parties desiring changes in agreements give 30 days
notice and that "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered ... until
1960]
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Before Norris-LaGuardia stripped federal courts of injunctive power, in-
junctions were granted when necessary to implement the RLA's policies. 4
When the RLA was subsequently amended, the draftsmen's failure to consider
the effects of Norris-LaGuardia raised the possibility that injunctive relief
might no longer be available. In Virginian Ry. v. Systent Fed'n No. 40,' 5
however, the Supreme Court held that Norris-LaGuardia does not forbid is-
suance of a mandatory injunction commanding an employer to bargain with a
certified union. The Court found that while Norris-LaGuardia outlawed use
of broad prohibitory injunctions against labor unions, it did not prohibit a
mandatory injunction against an employer.r 6 This position finds no support
in the language of that act, for the statute does not distinguish between man-
datory and prohibitory orders G7 and applies to suits against employers as well
as unions.58 But the Court also relied upon the canon of construction that
specific provisions of later statutes must prevail over conflicting provisions
which are earlier and more general.5 9 This approach seems not to depend upon
a finding that Congress explicitly intended to repeal portions of Norris-La-
Guardia; rather, it postulates two independent statutory provisions inconsist-
ent with each other-here, that the employer's duty to bargain under the RLA
the controversy has been finally acted upon as required by section 5 of this Act, by the
Mediation Board . . . ." Railway Labor Act § 5, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195 (1934), 45
U.S.C. § 155 (1958), orders continuance of the status quo until 30 days after NMB notice
of the failure of its mediatory efforts. Section 10, 44 Stat. 586, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160
(1958), provides for the establishment of an emergency board after mediation fails and
states that "[a]fter the creation of such a board, and for thirty days after such board has
made its report to the President, no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the
parties to the! controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose." The NMB,
unlike the NRAB, has no power to adjudicate and determine the merits of a dispute. Rail-
way Labor Act § 5 First, limits the NMB's function to mediation and recommendation of
arbitration, which either party may refuse. The Board, however, is empowered by § 2 Ninth,
48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth (1958), to certify majority bargaining rep-
resentatives, a determination which has been held to be nonreviewable by the courts. Switch-
men's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
54. Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
55. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
56. Id. at 563.
57. The statutory language distinguishes only between restraining orders and tem-
porary and permanent injunctions. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). This language, moreover, seems broad enough to include man-
datory decrees.
The court did not mention the fact that the original anti-injunction bill approved by the
conference committee contained a provision specifically prohibiting the issuance of man-
datory injunctions in labor disputes. Without explanation, the bill was withdrawn, sent back
to conference, and that provision was eliminated. 75 CONG. Rc. 6188, 6240, 6327-29, 6334-
37 (1932).
58. The Senate Report stated, "[T]he same rule throughout the bill, wherever it is
applicable, applies both to employers and employees, and also to organizations of employers
and employees." S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1932).
59. 300 U.S. at 563.
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is meaningless without the injunctive sanction to enforce it. The Court must
choose between the competing provisions, using whatever guides it can find
to approximate the decision Congress would have made if faced with the
choice. The Court focused upon the facts that the Railway Labor Act was
more specific than Norris-LaGuardia and that, as amended, it was the more
recent statute. If the conflict were only between two provisions giving differ-
ent answers to the same question, and if one answer had been specifically
adopted by a later Congress, this canon would seem adequate to the problem.
But the conflict between Norris-LaGuardia and the Railway Labor Act is not
of this order. Norris-LaGuardia disapproves of the injunction as a remedy,
even when the acts enjoined would be, in result, undesirable or unlawful. It
is not enough, therefore, to find that a later Congress specifically intended that
management should be made to bargain; the Court must find that Congress
would have desired that result even at the cost of using an undesirable remedy.
In order to judge how far Congress would have been willing to go in order
to effectuate its RLA policy, a court must introduce another factor into the
analysis-the importance or significance of the RLA provision. Although Vir-
ginian Ry. did not consider this additional factor, the Court's holding can be
reconciled with this view. The Court could have found that the provision
ordering the employer to bargain was so crucial that inability to enforce it
would have entirely undermined this major policy of federal labor legislation.
By comparison, the encroachment upon Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction
policy can be held to a minimum. While an injunctive decree must be granted,
the courts may still insist upon compliance with the Norris-LaGuardia pro-
visions framed to secure procedural fairness: guarantees of adequate notice,
hearing with oral testimony subject to cross-examination, and jury trials for
contempt proceedings. 6°
60. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958) ; § 11, 47
Stat. 72 (1932), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1958).
Because the RLA was drafted without consideration of Norris-LaGuardia's prohibitions,
courts should not employ the all-or-nothing approach implicit in the labels "repeal" or
"takes precedence" when attempting to harmonize the two pieces of legislation. Cf. State
of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945) ("[I]t is elementary that
repeals by implication are not favored. Only a clear repugnancy between the old law and
the new results in the former giving way and then only pro tanto to the extent of the repug-
nancy."). But see Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 266
F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1959) (alternative holding), rev'd on other grounds, 363 U.S. 528
(1960) (holding the "oral testimony" requirement of § 7 inapplicable to an RLA injunc-
tion because the RLA "takes precedence" over Norris-LaGuardia). Some procedural re-
quirements, of course, may not be compatible with RLA policies. The required finding of
danger to property under § 7(e), 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1958), would
frustrate relief in situations like Virginian Ry. Similarly, § 8's requirement that parties
make "every reasonable effort" to settle the dispute by arbitration, 47 Stat. 72 (1932), 29
U.S.C. § 108 (1958), would seem inapposite when the conduct enjoined is a strike to en-
force an NRAB order. Such a strike violates § 3(p) of the RLA, which provides the
exclusive remedy for refusals to obey NRAB decisions. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. Co. v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 40 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 66772 (D. Colo. 1960).
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Injunctions under the Railway Labor Act have also been granted to protect
employees' rights to fair representation by the bargaining representative. In
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry.,61 the Court, in order to avoid serious
constitutional questions presented by the act's establishment of the majority
union as exclusive bargaining representative, found that the RLA obligated
unions to bargain fairly on behalf of those they represent. Because this duty,
fundamental to the RLA's concept of collective bargaining, cannot be enforced
by either the NRAB or the NMB, 62 the Supreme Court held that Norris-
LaGuardia does not prevent the issuance of injunctions to enforce the Steele
doctrine, relying on Virginian Ry.
63
Another explanation of both the Virginian Ry. and Steele lines of cases has
been the observation that neither involved activity specifically immunized by
section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia. Although the activities were admittedly "labor
disputes" within the literal scope of section l's interdiction against injunctions
in all labor disputes, later decisions have held that section 1 may be circum-
scribed when protection of the activity in question seems inconsistent with the
procedures and policies of Norris-LaGuardia. For example, mandatory injunc-
tions compelling arbitration have been permitted because the procedures of
section 7 are patently inapplicable to such disputes and because section 8 of
Norris-LaGuardia demonstrates that Congress looked favorably on arbitra-
tion.
64
But in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. Ry.6 5 the
Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of an injunction against a strike-activi-
ty protected by section 4. The union struck over grievances after the railroad
had submitted the disputes to the NRAB. Norris-LaGuardia, the Court found,
did not prohibit injunctive relief against a strike designed to defeat the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the NRAB. Chicago River recognized that Norris-
LaGuardia and the RLA were "part of a pattern of labor legislation"0 6 and
that the two statutes must be accommodated "so that the obvious purpose in
the enactment of each is preserved." 67 Norris-LaGuardia, the Court reasoned,
freed labor from federal regulation and allowed it to pursue its goals through
61. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
62. The NMB has no adjudicatory or enforcement powers other than certification of
bargaining representatives. See note 53 supra. And, in Steele, where the question for ad-
judication is the validity of a collective agreement, the NRAB is powerless, for it is au-
thorized only to interpret and apply contracts. Railway Labor Act, § 3(i), 48 Stat. 1191
(1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1958).
63. Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
64. Local 205, UEW v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S.
547 (1957) (specific performance of arbitration clause ordered under Taft-Hartley, § 301).
The Supreme Court has cited this case with approval, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 n.8 (1957).
65. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
66. Id. at 42.
67. Id. at 40,
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the free use of economic force; but where the RLA provides mechanisms to
canalize economic struggle through compulsory arbitration of grievances, the
noninterference policy of Norris-LaGuardia is no longer applicable.6 8
The view that Norris-LaGuardia's primary purpose was to guarantee labor's
freedom by allowing free interplay of economic force greatly oversimplifies the
problem of accommodating that statute with later labor legislation. Under this
interpretation, the prohibition against injunctions can be lifted wherever Con-
gress, in a later statute, has indicated a contrary wish to limit or redirect
economic warfare.69 This view ignores Norris-LaGuardia's hostility to the
labor injunction itself as a regulatory sanction, a policy which the draftsmen
of the 1934 RLA amendments did not consider. The Court must ask, there-
fore, not whether Congress intended to replace economic warfare with peace-
ful arbitration (as it did), but whether that policy is sufficiently important in
this instance to warrant use of an otherwise undesirable remedy. Moreover,
since the congressional hostility to injunctive relief has not been contradicted
by later legislation, the court must also make certain that other remedies can-
not be used to avoid conflict with Norris-LaGuardia. If these criteria had been
applied in Chicago River, the result might still have been the same. The
NRAB's grievance machinery is essential to the regulatory scheme of the act,
and an integral part of the collective bargaining machinery developed in in-
dustries affected by the act.70 And the finding that NRAB procedure would
be rendered "nugatory" without injunctive relief 71 indicates the Court's belief
that other relief, such as damage actions against the union, was not available
under the RLA or, if available, would be ineffectual in securing compliance
68. Id. at 41. An injunction is not available under Chicago River unless one of the
parties has submitted the dispute to the NRAB. Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 353
U.S. 927 (1957) (per curiamn) (injunction granted by Missouri court under F-LA vacated
without prejudice to its reinstatement if either party to the "minor" dispute submitted it
to the NRAB within a reasonable time). Moreover, a strike cannot be enjoined, however
undesirable its purpose, unless the union's aim is to violate the RLA. Order of R.R. Tele-
graphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (extreme form of feather-bedding).
69. Commentators who regard government neutrality in labor disputes as the dominant
policy of Norris-LaGuardia thus tend to simplify the conflict between that statute and later
acts as a clash between policies of laissez faire and governmental intervention. See Loeb,
Accommodation of the ANorris-LaGuardia Act to Other Federal Statutes, 11 LAB. L.J.
473, 476 (1960), 72 HARv. L. REv. 354, 356-57 (1958).
70. Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative
Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567, 598 (1937).
71. 353 U.S. at 41.
For evaluation of the damage action as a remedy in these circumstances, see note 165
infra.
Although the RLA does not authorize damage actions to compensate for violations of
the act, the availability of such relief would seem implicit in the Chicago River decision,
which allows similarly unauthorized equitable relief to a private party. On the other hand,
one court has held that the lack of specific authorization for damage actions, when con-
trasted to § 301 of Taft-Hartley, indicates that such actions cannot be brought under the
RLA. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1958). In this event, the
Chicago River finding that injunctive relief is necessary would be unquestionable.
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with the statutory grievance procedure. Nevertheless, enunciating the decision
to override Norris-LaGuardia in this manner would make it clear that Norris-
LaGuardia is not repudiated by every statute which seeks to limit the free use
of economic power, and that even when the anti-injunction statute must be
set aside, the court should cut away only so much of the statute as is necessary
to avoid the conflict. Provisions such as the act's procedural safeguards, which
do not hamper enforcement of the RLA, should be retained in deference to
the still vital policy against injunctions3
2
Post-Accommodation Problems
When deciding whether to subordinate Norris-LaGuardia's policies to those
of another statute, courts should also be aware that new legal problems may
be created by the availability of the injunction. Many substantive legal rules
developed before injunctive relief was made available may take on a different
complexion after the barriers of Norris-LaGuardia have been lowered. For
example, certain inequities of the existing law might have been tolerated in
the past because of an implicit belief that, in the last resort, the union could
overcome its disadvantage by resort to economic force. When this ultimate
safeguard is withdrawn, courts may feel compelled to tinker with the existing
legal rules in order to redress the resulting imbalance, reassuming the policy-
making function which Norris-LaGuardia attempted to reserve to Congress.
The difficulties inherent in this corrective process are illustrated by the sub-
sequent history of the Chicago River problem.
The Chicago River decision raised the fear that management could make
extensive unilateral changes in the collective bargaining agreement shielded
by the strike injunction from union reprisals. Although the Chicago River in-
junction is permitted only in the case of "minor" disputes 73 -"growing out
of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements" 74 -
and thus would seem not to affect the union's power to strike over changes in
terms of the agreement (so called "major disputes"), the limitation was feared
to be illusory. Arguably, management could bring any disputed change under
the "minor" disputes jurisdiction of the NRAB by finding an ambiguity in
the contract to support its position. The typical railway labor dispute involves
the vague management-prerogatives provisions of the contract.75 The carrier,
72. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 68 supra. But see Comment, Enjoining Strikes and laintahing the Status
Quo in Railway Labor Disputes, 60 CoLum. L. Ryv. 381, 391 (1960) (strike over "major
dispute" before compliance with procedures required by §§ 5, 6, 10, should be enjoined
despite Norris-LaGuardia).
74. Railway Labor Act § 3(i), as amended, 48 Stat. 1191 (1943), 45 U.S.C. § 153(i)
(1958).
75. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United R.R. Workers, 271 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), vacated,
364 U.S. 278 (1960) ; Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 268
F.2d 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959) ; In the Matter of Hudson & M.R.R.,
172 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiain sub. norn. Stichman v. General Grievance
Committee, 267 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Brotherhood of
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in the interests of efficiency, makes operational or technological changes result-
ing in lay-offs or otherwise affecting working conditions. If the contract grants
management all prerogatives not explicitly surrendered, the contract permits
the change; if, on the other hand, all existing working conditions are incor-
porated into the contract, management is changing the terms of the agreement.
Thus, the dispute is "minor" in the sense that there is an ambiguity which
may be resolved only by "interpretation or application of the agreement," and
the union can be enjoined from striking until the NRAB resolves the inter-
pretation dispute.
In theory, the union is protected against unilateral changes by this proce-
dure, for if the NRAB decides that the contract did not allow management to
make the change, the union can receive retroactive relief for damages suffered
while the change was in force. And if management continues to insist upon
the change, the union can then use economic force to resist it.76 It has been
argued, however, that the excessive delay of NRAB procedures tends to make
both these protective remedies ineffective . 7 Discharged workers cannot afford
to wait out the five-year NRAB adjudication in the hope of reinstatement and
back pay.7 8 And since existing case law allowed management to institute its
proposed changes during the NRAB proceeding,7 9 the union will find it diffi-
cult to rouse economic pressure five years later over a dead issue. For these
reasons, the argument concludes, the injunction destroys the unions right to
use economic force to resist unilateral changes.
Because the alleged hardship to the union arises from the delay between the
institution of proposed changes by management and the NRAB's final decision,
corrective measures would seem to require either that management be ordered
to postpone changes until after adjudication, or that delay be eliminated by
permitting the federal court to resolve contract ambiguities immediately. Be-
fore Chicago River, both of these alternatives had been rejected. In Order of
Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, the Supreme Court had stated that ambiguities of
collective agreements must be resolved initially by the NRAB, even though
the dispute may involve section 6 changes.80 Because interpretation rests on
Locomotive Eng'rs, 266 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 363 U.S. 528
(1960); Norfolk & P.B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958).
76. After the NRAB interprets the contract to provide that management does not have
power to make the change, further attempts at change become "major disputes." The union
may strike over major disputes, Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362
U.S. 330 (1960).
77. See Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo in Railway Labor
Disputes, 60 COLUm. L. Rav. 381, 393 (1960).
78. In In the Matter of Hudson & M.R.R., 178 F. Supp. 106, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
the court quoted from a letter from the Executive Secretary of the NRAB which stated
that "5/ years is the present average period of time between the docketing of a case and
rendition of an award." Cases currently remain on the Board's docket from 3 to 7 years.
See, e.g., 137 NRAB AWARDS, IST Div. (1958).
79. Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1945).
80. 326 U.S. 561 (1945).
1960]
HeinOnline -- 70 Yale L.J. 83 1960-1961
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
considerations of usage, practice, and custom in the industry, the question was
"intricate and technical" and had been left by Congress to the specially con-
stituted NRAB.81 Also, the Court apparently rejected the union's plea for a
temporary injunction against the proposed changes, and permitted the em-
ployer to make the changes pending final adjudication by the NRAB.
s2
After Chicago River, however, the Supreme Court modified the minor-dis-
putes procedure, apparently in the belief that the availability of strike injunc-
tions had created the alleged hardship and thus had altered the balance of
power. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry.
Co., it authorized courts issuing strike injunctions under Chicago River to
condition injunctive relief upon preservation of the status quo by management
pending final adjudication by the NRAB.83 The holding relies principally on
the traditional power of equity courts to impose conditions upon issuance of
extraordinary remedies when necessary to avoid injustices. The decision re-
quires, therefore, that the court may not impose the status quo condition unless
it finds that the immediate institution of proposed management changes will
cause irreparable injury to the union. In addition, the Court commented that
the status quo condition may be necessary to preserve the integrity of NRAB
procedures, reasoning that the prolonged impact of changed conditions may
so weaken the union's position that final victory before the NRAB would
be meaningless. Since the condition comes into force only when a strike has
been enjoined,8 4 it seems intended as a device to compensate for the potential
hardships caused by the Chicago River decision.
81. Id. at 567.
The Court's conclusion in Pitney seems necessary to avoid involving the judiciary in a
task for which it is ill suited. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations,
68 HAav. L. REv. 999 (1952) ; Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice
Through the Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1952); Wellington, Judge
Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1268 (1959).
82. Although the court does not deal with the issue of temporary relief in its opinion,
the dissent of Justice Rutledge, 326 U.S. at 568, arguing for such relief demonstrates that
the issue was before the Court.
83. 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
This device is not an injunction in the usual sense, for the word "condition" seems to
indicate that retention of the status quo by the employer is merely a prerequisite to injunc-
tive relief against union economic pressure. If the employer refuses to fulfill this require-
ment, he would not, therefore, be subject to contempt proceedings, but the union would be
free to strike.
84. The Court stated that it was not deciding the question whether a status quo in-
junction could be issued against employer changes in the absence of a suit for equitable
relief against a strike. Id. at 531 n.3. The Court had, however, denied such relief sub silentio
in Pitney. See note 82 supra and accompanying text. And the grievance procedure estab-
lished by the RLA would not seem to authorize such relief. See notes 88-89 infra and ac-
companying text.
The Court's argument that the "condition" may be necessary to preserve the NRAB's
jurisdiction, while appearing to furnish an independent ground for the status quo injunction
under the Chicago River rationale, see text accompanying note 65 supra, seems instead
intended to show that when such conditions are imposed upon issuance of a Chicago River
injunction, the policy underlying injunctive relief will be fostered by the condition.
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In attempting to compensate, however, the Court may have defeated the
Railway Labor Act policies which Chicago River sought to promote. Avail-
ability of the status quo order will probably discourage compulsory arbitration
and use of the NRAB. If an employer wishes to effectuate technological
changes in an area where his authority is unclear, submission of the question
to the NRAB will, after A-K-T, mean a delay of several years before the
change can be made. Because such delay may destroy the value of the change,
the carrier may prefer either to eschew relief under Chicago River or to by-
pass the NRAB entirely. Unless the union is too weak to resist by economic
force, it too will prefer to avoid the delay of NRAB proceedings, for the status
quo condition is available to it only at the cost of the corollary strike injunc-
tion. Since the NRAB cannot act unless one of the parties invokes its juris-
diction,"' such disputes are likely to be settled outside the statutory grievance
machinery, by resort to economic force.
Moreover, the M-K-T decision assigns to the courts the power to re-evaluate
and reject traditional procedures of grievance arbitration which Congress had
incorporated into the RLA. Recognizing management's continuing need to
seek more efficient methods, traditional procedure leaves management free to
act immediately on good faith interpretations of the collective agreement. The
union may protest such determinations only through grievance proceedings, 6
which protect the union from violations of the collective agreement by award-
ing retroactive relief to injured employees. Although such relief may not fully
compensate injured employees, there is no better alternative-management
cannot be compensated for opportunities lost when changes are delayed.8 This
practice antedated the RLA, s and that act, by establishing detailed provisions
for compulsory arbitration of grievances without explicitly reversing the tradi-
tional pattern, apparently incorporated it.8 9 The need for such management
freedom is particularly apparent in the declining railway industry, where con-
85. Railway Labor Act § 3(i), added by 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153(i)
(1958).
86. See, e.g., the arbitration opinions of Harry Shulman, umpire for the Ford Motor
Co. and the UAW, reprinted in CHAMBERLAIN, SOURC BOOK ON LABOR 638-43 (1958).
87. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United R.R. Workers, 271 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1959),
vacated, 364 U.S. 278 (1960).
88. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Western Md. Ry., 1925 U.S.R.R.
LAB. BD. 720 (Decision No. 3340, 1925) ; Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-
Kansas-Texas Lines, 1925 U.S.R.R. LAB. BD. 852 (Decision 3473, 1925).
89. Section 3(i), 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1958), provides
that grievances are to be "handled in the usual manner" before submission to the NRAB.
This provision would seem by its terms to allow the parties to formulate the early stages
of the grievance procedure through collective bargaining and, therefore, to incorporate past
practices not explicitly changed by collective agreements. Moreover, §§ 3(m) & (o), 44
Stat. 576 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153(m) & (o) (1958), clearly indicates that
money awards and other relief (presumably reinstatement) may be given to injured em-
ployees, thus creating the inference that employers may act before a final interpretation is
rendered and that the union's remedy lies in retroactive relief from the NRAB. Other pro-
visions, such as §§ 5, 6, 10, 44 Stat. 580, 582, 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156,
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tinual technical innovation is essential to the industry's survival.0 M-K-T
seems to disregard the congressional approval of this grievance procedure; the
Supreme Court authorized district courts to balance "competing claims of
irreparable hardship" 91 in each dispute and to come to their own conclusion
as to which party should bear the burdens of grievance arbitration. Compari-
son of relative hardships ultimately forces a court to decide how much hard-
ship labor or management ought to bear in the collective bargaining process
and thus injects the judiciary into precisely that delicate policy-making area
which Norris-LaGuardia preserves to Congress. The dangers of judicial inter-
vention are clearly demonstrated by the result in M-K-T. The status quo con-
dition does not correct the imbalance supposedly engendered by the Chicago
River decision; rather, it enlarges and reverses it by shifting the risk of loss
to management, the party without any remedy in the NRAB.92
While the disturbance of basic RLA policies is itself a sufficient ground for
questioning the wisdom of judicial tinkering, the attempted correction in M-
K-T was particularly inappropriate because it was unnecessary. Closer exami-
nation of the precise impact of Chicago River reveals that the union's power
to strike over "minor" disputes was not seriously curtailed by that decision.
A union anxious to strike over a "minor" dispute can do so simply by termi-
nating the contract after 30 days notice and proposing new contract provisions
which would retroactively prohibit the changes instituted by management. In
a post-Chicago River decision, the Supreme Court held that this tactic creates
a "major" dispute in which injunctive relief is not available.93 Thus, the re-
strictive effect of Chicago River upon which M-K-T seems predicated, is in
fact nominal, for a union may still, after following the proper procedures, resort
to economic force to win its point.
The problems raised by superimposing injunctive relief upon the provisions
of the Railway Labor Act demonstrate that accommodation of Norris-La-
Guardia involves more than the task of weighing conflicting indications of
legislative intent. Courts must also attempt to gauge the dislocating effect
which the availability of injunctive relief may have upon established statutory
rules and procedures. This problem should not have affected the Chicago
River decision, for the dislocation later found in M-K-T was in fact illusory.
160 (1958), governing procedures for the resolution of "major" disputes, indicate that when
Congress desired that the status quo be maintained during a dispute, the draftsmen so pro-
vided in explicit terms.
90. See Horowitz, Labor's Role in the Declining Railroad Industry, 9 LAB. L.J. 473
(1958).
91. 363 U.S. at 535.
92. Railway Labor Act § 3(o), 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153(o)
(1958), directing the carrier "to pay the employee the sum to which he is entitled under
the award," indicates that the NRAB may not compensate carriers for losses suffered as
a result of the status quo injunction. Moreover, NRAB awards to employers would pose
difficulties-it is not clear whether the union or the workers who retained employment pend-
ing NRAB determination would pay. For employees, this would be an intolerable risk.
93. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
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On the other hand, if the court is convinced that injunctive relief will require
further corrective adjustments in the regulatory statute, this possibility should
weigh against the initial decision to abandon Norris-LaGuardia. The results
of judicial adjustment in M-K-T demonstrate that the need to make further
corrections will reinstall the courts squarely in the role of labor policy-making,
as well as jeopardize the very policies which seem to require injunctive relief.
In this event, courts might better effectuate the overall scheme of national
labor policy by choosing to abide by Norris-LaGuardia from the beginning.
JUDICIAL REGULATION OF LABOR UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Conflicts between the policies of Norris-LaGuardia and those of the Sher-
man Act 94 compel courts to reconcile statutes dealing with different, but over-
lapping, spheres of economic activity. While the anti-injunction statute deals
solely with union activity, the antitrust law's primary concern is with the
promotion of business competition. 95 Indeed, it is doubtful that Congress, in
passing the Sherman Act, intended to bring unions within its prohibitions. 96
Judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act's vague mandates, however, brought
many union activities within their ambit.97 Federal judges, unfettered by any
statutory standard, enforced their policy preferences by the application of
vague, abstract doctrines essentially unrelated to the fundamental policy de-
cisions being made.98 In the labor provisions of the Clayton Act, Congress
94. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 10 (1958).
95. ATT'v GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 1 (1955).
96. The principal .argument for the inclusion of labor organizations was that Congress
had rejected a proposed amendment explicitly exempting unions. See Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274 (1908). A thorough search of the legislative history of the Sherman Act,
however, has led one author to conclude that the proposed amendment was offered before
a substantially revised bill was submitted by the Senate Judiciary Committee and that Con-
gress assumed that this latter measure did not reach union activities. BERMAN, LABOR AND
THE SHERMAN AcT 3-54 (1930).
97. United States v. Painters Dist. Council, 44 F.2d 58 (N.D. Ill. 1930), aff'd, 284
U.S. 582 (1931) (make-work practices) ; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) (refusal to work on blacklisted goods) ; United States
v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926) (union-employer combination to boycott nonunion goods) ;
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (organization strike
against a nonunion mine whose low labor costs were endangering the competitive standing
of unionized firms) ; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (secondary
boycott).
98. On the one hand, the Supreme Court stated that the "mere reduction in the supply
of an article to be shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of
its manufacture or production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that com-
merce. But when the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production
is shown to be to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in interstate com-
merce, or the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-
Trust Act." Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1929). Never-
theless, in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 47
(1927), a refusal to work on "blacklisted" goods was found to be a violation because it was
"an attack upon the use of the product in other states ... with the intent and purpose of
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apparently attempted to modify these judicial restrictions,"9 but the Supreme
Court effectively nullified the provisions in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deer-
ing 100 by construing them as a codification of existing law. Moreover, some
lower federal courts, shielded from effective review because labor disputes
seldom survived issuance of the injunction,101 extended the doctrines beyond
even the decidedly anti-union precedents of the Supreme Court, and applied
the antitrust laws to any activity the judiciary considered harmful. 02
After 1930, however, congressional approbation of collective bargaining
expressed in Norris-LaGuardia and the Wagner Act, coupled with increased
Supreme Court awareness of the need for judicial self-restraint in the labor
field, caused a reversal of the restrictive precedents. The Court held in Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader that union activities did not violate the antitrust laws
unless they resulted in a "restraint upon commercial competition. '1 0(3 In a
well-considered dictum, the Court indicated that organizational and recogni-
tional efforts would not be such a restraint even if aimed at protecting union-
ized employers from competition with nonunion goods produced at a lower
labor cost. 04 While Apex was an attempt to narrow the Sherman Act's pro-
bringing about the loss or serious reduction of petitioners' interstate business.... ." Although
the opinion clearly implies that some strikes are lawful, all work stoppages are designed
to terminate the manufacture and shipment of goods or otherwise prevent the employer from
engaging in his normal operations.
Moreover, decisions under the Sherman Act were necessarily determined by definitions
of interstate commerce, a criterion having no relation to labor policy. The situation became
ludicrous when mechanical notions of interstate commerce were applied. Compare Anderson
v. Shipowners' Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926), with Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 64 (1925). Compare Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 40 F.2d 189 (2d (ir. 1930), with Lever-
ing & Gerrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933).
99. Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958); § 20, 38 Stat. 738
(1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958). See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
479 (1924) (dissent of Brandeis, J.). The intent of Congress, however, in passing the Clay-
ton Act was by no means clear. FRANKFURTER & GREENE 141-45.
100. 254 U.S. 443 (1924).
101. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
102. Compare Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 263 Fed. 171 (N.D. Ohio
1920) (violence), and Williams v. United States, 295 Fed. 302 (5th Cir. 1932) (putting
quicksilver in locomotive engines), and United States v. Norris, 255 Fed. 423 (N.D. Ill.
1918) (picketing for purposes of extortion), and O'Brien v. United States, 290 Fed. 185
(6th Cir. 1923) (per curiam) (preventing delivery of one piece of steel across state line),
with United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924), and
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922). In another line of cases,
the lower federal courts enjoined strikes which they felt created public emergencies. United
States v. Railway Employees' Dep't, 283 Fed. 479 (N.D. Ill. 1922) (railroad strike) ; West-
ern Union Tel. v. Local 134, IBEW, 2 F.2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 1924) (telegraph strike);
Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. District Lodge No. 9, IAM, 252 Fed. 597 (E.D. Mo. 1918)
(munitions plant strike). These cases, however, might have been approved by the Supreme
Court. Cf. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (enjoining a widespread railway stoppage under
the laws governing carriage of the mails and interstate commerce).
103. 310 U.S. 469, 497 (1940).
104. Id. at 503-04.
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hibitions, its "commercial restraints" test provided no standards by which anti-
trust violations could be identified. 10 5 Thus the decision left courts free to con-
tinue evaluating the legitimacy of labor objectives, preserving much of the
Sherman Act's impact on labor. Opportunities for enforcing the remaining
antitrust restrictions seemed limited, however, by Norris-LaGuardia's pro-
hibition of injunctive relief, for the injunction bar was held applicable to anti-
trust suits against unions.10 6
Avoiding this restriction, the Attorney General's office began a series of
criminal prosecutions against unions engaging in certain activities felt to be
especially detrimental to the economy.10 7 The first such prosecution to reach
the Supreme Court, United States v. Hutcheson, was brought against the
Carpenters Union for striking to secure jobs which, under the terms of a col-
lective agreement, were reserved for members of the Machinists Union. 0 8
The Court held that Norris-LaGuardia, although on its face applicable only
to injunction suits, was intended to restore the broad purpose of the Clayton
Act which Duplex had nullified. 109 Reasoning that the Sherman, Norris-La-
Guardia, and Clayton Acts must be read together "as a harmonizing text of
outlawry of labor conduct,"" 0 the Court held that it was incongruous to pro-
hibit by criminal penalties conduct allowable in equity.-" Consequently, union
activities specified in section 20 of the Clayton Act were held immune from
Sherman Act liability regardless of the remedy sought.
105. The opinion itself is unclear, for it attempts to reconcile most of the older cases
with its new approach and suggests at one place that the size of the strike may be deter-
minative. Id. at 512-13.
106. Local 753, Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311
U.S. 91 (1940).
The "commercial restraints" distinction led the Attorney General's Committee to com-
ment,
From this decision there emerges a distinction ... between union activities aim-
ing, on the one hand, at furthering rightful uniom objectives and, on the other, at
directly "suppressing [commercial competition] or fixing prices" of commercial prod-
ucts.
Avr'Y GEN. NAT"L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 296 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
107. The labor activities attacked were:
1. Unreasonable restraints designed to prevent the use of cheaper material, improved
equipment, or more efficient methods....
2. Unreasonable restraints designed to compel the hiring of useless and unnecessary
labor....
3. Unreasonable restraints designed to enforce systems of graft and extortion....
4. Unreasonable restraints designed to enforce illegally fixed prices....
5. Unreasonable restraints designed to destroy an established and legitimate system
of collective bargaining....
Public letter From Assistant Attorney General Thurman W. Arnold to the Central Labor
Union of Indianapolis, reprinted in ARNOLD, BOTTLENEcC:S or BUSINESS 251-52 (1940).
108. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
109. Id. at 236.
110. Id. at 231.
111. Id. at 234-35.
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[S]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups, the licit and illicit under section 20 are not to be dis-
tinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the right-
ness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the
particular union activities are the means.1
2
While the language and legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia give no
evidence of specific congressional intent to grant this immunity, policies of
that statute and the National Labor Relations Act seem to compel the result
reached in Hutcheson. Both Norris-LaGuardia, withdrawing the injunctive
source of judicial regulation, and the NLRA, through the establishment of a
specialized agency, reflect congressional desire to depose the judiciary from
their self-appointed role as arbiters of the labor-management struggle and to
make the formulation of labor policy solely a legislative and administrative
responsibility." 3 Apex, focusing solely on the modification of legal rules, sanc-
tioned a continuation of judicial regulation and thus failed to recognize this
new policy. Hutcheson, however, looking to the institutional structure estab-
lished by Congress, accommodated the new policies by reasserting the limita-
tions of section 20 to eliminate the Sherman Act as a vehicle for unwanted
judicial policy making.
The Court has found an exception to Hutcheson's broad exemption when
unions act in concert with nonlabor groups. In Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
IBEW,114 the local union secured closed shop contracts with manufacturers
and contractors dealing in electrical equipment in New York City, and all
three groups established a system under which the contractors bought only
from unionized manufacturers, and the manufacturers, in turn, sold only to
unionized contractors. A board was created to bring recalcitrant employers
into line, the union enforcing the system through strikes and picketing. The
boycott extended to all goods not manufactured by Local 3, excluding from
the New York market even products of firms organized by other locals of the
same international union. The Court found that the conspiracy between the
employers alone would have been a clear violation of the antitrust laws." 5 It
also found that the union's activities were a "labor dispute" as defined by
section 13 of Norris-LaGuardia." 6 Under Hutcheson, therefore, such union
activities would normally have been exempted from the antitrust laws. Facing
the question whether collusion with an employer combination took labor out-
side the Hutcheson shelter, the Court reasoned that the immunity from anti-
112. Id. at 232.
113. A conflict in substantive law also existed. Section 7 of the NLRA gave employees
"the right... to engage in. . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection." 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
Sherman Act case-law outlawed many such activities. See notes 97-98 supra. This conflict,
however, might have been resolved by attempting to redefine the Sherman Act's limitations
on labor activities-as Apex apparently attempted to do.
114. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
115. Id. at 800.
116. Id. at 807 n.12.
[ Vol. 70 :70
HeinOnline -- 70 Yale L.J. 90 1960-1961
LABOR INJUNCTIONS
trust prosecutions had been granted only for the purpose of aiding the union's
collective bargaining and was never intended to be used as a shield to protect
businessmen in achieving monopoly conditions forbidden by antitrust law.
117
The Court seemed to assume that a finding of union immunity would have
allowed the entire conspiracy to continue, for in enjoining the union it failed
to consider the alternative of dissolving the conspiracy simply by enjoining
employers from combining with each other or with the union. That the Allen-
Bradley decision turned on the Court's fear of shielding business participants
from antitrust prosecution is further emphasized by the Court's holding that
collusion with nonlabor organizations is essential to the union's liability.
[T)he same labor union activities [having the same economic effect] may
or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether
the union acts alone or in combination with business groups .... A busi-
ness monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such
participation is a violation of the Act." 8
Although an exception to Hutcheson, Allen-Bradley does not raise the dan-
gers of judicial policy-making which were present under the courts' general
Sherman Act jurisdiction. The immunities granted by Norris-LaGuardia and
Hutcheson 118 were in part motivated by the fear that, in the absence of anti-
trust standards applicable to union conduct, courts would use Sherman Act
jurisdiction to make their own policy judgments about the legitimacy of union
conduct. In Allen-Bradley, however, the existence of the antitrust violation
was based upon an analysis of management conduct, according to antitrust
principles dealing with business activities. The union's activity was found to
be one part of a much larger inter-employer conspiracy.120 Thus the Court was
able to resolve the problem of the union violation by reference to principles
of business conduct which bore no relation to the legitimacy or desirability of
the union activity involved. Indeed, the Court admitted that the union was
furthering its own legitimate interest in jobs and wages,1' 1 but apparently con-
sidered such motives irrelevant in light of the employer conspiracy. Under
this reading of Allen-Bradley, a union's liability would rest solely upon the
117. Id. at 809-10.
The Court's finding that Norris-LaGuardia is inapplicable may be overstated. Even if
federal business policy warrants imposition of the injunction in such cases, there seems no
reason for denying unions the various procedural safeguards afforded by Norris-LaGuardia
by holding that act totally inapplicable. See note 61 supra.
118. 325 U.S. at 810-11; accord, United States v. Employing Plasterers' Ass'n, 347
U.S. 186 (1954) ; United States v. Employing Lathers' Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198 (1954) ; Lumber
Prods. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 144 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1944), aff'd sub nom. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947) ; Local 175, IBEW v.
United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Chattanooga Chapter, Nat'l
Elec. Contractors' Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
119. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
120. 325 U.S. at 809.
121. Id. at 801.
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question whether it participates in a management conspiracy, aiding the for-
bidden practices.
Separating the employer's action from the union's conduct in order to re-
solve the antitrust problem may be difficult, however, when there is not an
independent and far-reaching management conspiracy as in Allen-Bradley.
Many terms of collective agreements tend to restrict competition within an
industry, providing uniform wage rates, work rules, and provisions against
labor saving devices.122 These terms may meet with the approval of a majority
of the employers who prefer to suppress cost-cutting practices of a competitor
for the purpose of obtaining higher prices. The Allen-Bradley distinction be-
tween practices engaged in by the union alone or as part of an employer con-
spiracy would seem to require a determination whether management somehow
conspired to obtain anticompetitive terms, or whether it submitted to them
through the process of collective bargaining. Cases dealing with such problems
after Allen-Bradley have looked to evidence indicating whether the employers
favored or opposed the union's objective.1 23 While such standards are difficult
to apply when union and management have a mutual interest, they have at
least the advantage of remaining neutral to the legitimacy of the union objec-
tive involved. On the other hand, the substantive nature of the union's demand
might in some cases raise a presumption of management collusion. A contrac-
tual provision fixing prices or restricting the suppliers or distributors with
whom a group of employers may deal 12 by virtue of its uniqueness and
apparently predominant benefit to management, may itself be evidence that the
employers have actively conspired to secure such terms, and in turn render the
union's conduct an antitrust violation. In judging the peculiarity of any par-
ticular term of a collective agreement for this purpose, the court will be judg-
ing union conduct according to some unspecified norm of traditional union
objectives and practices.
12 5
122. The problem has arisen in areas where a union has organized all the major com-
peting businesses in a trade, and one of these, through a particular method of operations,
is able to secure a competitive advantage over the other firms. The union, in order to pro-
tect jobs, may then, with or without the "collusion" of the other employers, attempt to
secure contract provisions destroying this advantage. See Jewel Tea Co., Inc. v. Local 189,
274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46 (8th
Cir. 1958); Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-Engravers Ass'n, 155 F.2d
799 (3d Cir. 1946).
123. See cases cited note 122 supra. Some courts seem to adopt a more mechanical
test. See United States v. Local 471, Milk Drivers Union, 153 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn.
1957) (incorporation in collective agreement constitutes Allen-Bradley collusion).
124. See United States v. Hamilton Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1957) (wage
differential depending upon source of supply). But see Davis Plating & Button Co. v. Cali-
fornia Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 145 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
125. Allen-Bradley may also apply to cases involving one employer and one union. See,
e.g., United States v. Bitz, 179 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (agreement to exclude com-
petitors from the market). Since the employer in Bitz was attempting to monopolize and
thus was guilty of an employer violation acting alone, the case does not raise the issue
whether an employer-union conspiracy will satisfy the conspiracy requirement of § 1 of the
[Vol. 70 :70
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Broader exceptions to Hutcheson have been urged by the Attorney Gen-
eral's Report and are reflected in several lower court decisions after Allen-
Bradley. The Report reasons that activity aimed at "direct commercial re-
straint" may not be a labor dispute within the meaning of Norris-LaGuar-
dia,'12 whether or not there is collusion with nonlabor groups. This interpre-
tation seeks to keep the Apex doctrine in force. Similarly, courts examining
joint activity have emphasized the legitimacy of the labor objective involved
rather than looking to the existence of a management violation.127
These exceptions would inject judges into matters of labor policy without
sufficient legislative guidance, contrary to the Norris-LaGuardia policy ex-
plained in Hitcheson. The importance and continued vitality of that policy is
underscored by congressional action since the Hutcheson decision, 2 8 for Con-
gress has continued to assume the task of regulating union activity which
affects competitive market conditions. In the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress sub-
jected a wide range of union activity to NLRB regulation; and, in passing
that statute, it considered problems of anticompetitive union behavior. A pro-
posal to withdraw the Clayton Act's exemption of labor unions when they
engaged in direct market restraint was specifically rejected in conference. The
conference report explained,
Since the matters dealt with in this section have to a large measure
been effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since the conference
agreement contains effective provisions directly dealing with boycotts
themselves, this provision is omitted from the conference agreement. 2 9
Further congressional regulation of this area is found in the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 which deals with two other
sources of union market control-"hot cargo" clauses and organizational
picketing.130 The increasing activity of Congress in defining labor's responsi-
bilities under the antitrust policies gives an even stronger reason for judicial
self-limitation in this area.
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), or whether two or more employers
must conspire to restrain trade. Compare ATT'Y GEx. NAT'L Comm. ANTrrRUsT REP. 297-
98 (1955), with Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 252, 270-72 (1955). The Allen-Bradley distinction between a union acting "alone"
or "in combination with business groups," 325 U.S. at 810-11, seems to require a separate
conspiracy between employers, for the word "alone" is used in a context referring to union
relations with an individual employer.
126. A ''Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 299-300 (1955); cf. I.P.C. Distribs.,
Inc. v. Local 110, Chicago Moving Picture Math. Operators, 132 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Ill.
1955) (dictum).
127. Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46, 54 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Pevely
Dairy Co. v. Local 603, Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 174 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
128. Prior to Taft-Hartley, the unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA, § 8, 49
Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958) regulated only management con-
duct.
129. H. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1947).
130. 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(b) (7), 158(e) (Supp. 1959).
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INJUNCTIW RELIEF UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY
Problems of accommodating Norris-LaGuardia to the Taft-Hartley Act 131
are radically different from those encountered under either the Sherman Act
or the Railway Labor Act, for Taft-Hartley was enacted by a Congress aware
of the limitations of Norris-LaGuardia. The act permits use of injunctions in
certain situations but surrounds their issuance with elaborate procedures and
safeguards. Under sections 10(j) and (1), the NLRB is empowered to seek
injunctions against suspected unfair labor practices prior to final Board ad-
judication.13 2 Because such relief is not available to private parties and may
be sought only after a specialized agency has made preliminary findings of
fact and law justifying issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint, 133 many
of the evils associated with the private use of injunctions in labor disputes
are thus eliminated. Sections 206 to 210, dealing with "national emergency
strikes," also allow injunctive relief for a period of eighty days, but only upon
the discretionary order of the President.13 Only section 302, dealing with
employer payments to union representatives and the management of pension
and welfare funds, explicitly allows private parties to seek injunctions ;135 but
these areas are peripheral to the labor objectives and activities protected by
Norris-LaGuardia, and the controversies under this section often may not be
section 13 "labor disputes. '136 In all these provisions, Congress stated explicit-
ly that Norris-LaGuardia was not applicable. Moreover, analysis of the de-
bates on Taft-Hartley reveal a congressional belief that Norris-LaGuardia
would remain in effect where not specifically overruled. 137 Finally, the restric-
tions placed upon use of injunctive relief and the importance of the issue in
legislative debates 13s demonstrate the continued suspicion of injunctions as
a remedy in labor disputes.
These limitations, however, have not prevented federal courts from issuing
injunctions, without express statutory authorization, to compel majority rep-
131. Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 519
(1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-52, 155-57, 161-63, 165-85 (1958), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 153-54, 158-60,
164, 186-87 (Supp. 1959).
132. Labor-Management Relations Act §§ 10(j) & (1), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended,
72 Stat. 945 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1958), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(l) (Supp. 1959). Sec-
tion 10(j) authorizes the NLRB to seek in its discretion an injunction against alleged un-
fair labor practices after issuance of a complaint by theGeneral Counsel; 10(1) requires
that such relief be sought as a prerequisite to issuing a complaint against alleged violations
of §§ 8(b) (4) (A-C),-(b) (7),-(e).
133. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (Supp. 1960).
134. 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1958).
135. 73 Stat. 537 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 186 (Supp. 1960).
136. See generally Note, Taft-Hartley Regulation of Employer Payments to Union
Representatives: Bribery, Extortion and Welfare Funds Under Section 302, 67 YALE L.J.
732 (1958).
137. See the remarks of Senator Taft in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 1365, 1396.
138. Id. at 1365 (Senator Taft).
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resentatives to bargain fairly on behalf of those they represent. 13 9 This duty,
derived from an identical duty imposed on railway unions by the Steele doc-
trine, 140 has been read into the exclusive representation provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act. Arguably, use of injunctions to enforce the
Steele mandate can be reconciled with Taft-Hartley's intent to preserve
Norris-LaGuardia on the ground that none of these cases involve activities
specifically immunized by section 4 of the anti-injunction statute.14 1 Section 4
has been used as a guide to discover the activities which Congress particularly
wished to shield from injunctive relief.'4 But the legislative history and statu-
tory language of Norris-LaGuardia clearly indicate that injunctions are pro-
hibited in all "labor disputes," regardless of whether such activities are
enumerated in section 4.143 A further attempt to distinguish these cases rests
on the view that injunctive relief under Steele is necessary to avoid a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the NLRA. Without injunctive relief, it is
argued, the right to fair representation would be inefficacious and the statu-
tory system of exclusive representation would violate rights of the minority.'4
Since the Steele duty was created by the courts and is not explicitly mentioned
in the act it may be possible to infer that Congress never considered the ques-
tion of remedies to enforce that duty. Thus, the Court's approval of Steele
injunctions would not repudiate the general congressional policy to limit in-
junctive relief under the Taft-Hartley Act. It would not, for example, serve as
a precedent for allowing injunctive relief to enforce duties specifically enum-
erated in the act.
The explicit statutory duty most likely to invite further encroachment upon
Norris-LaGuardia is section 301 145 which gives federal courts apparently
139. Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
140. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
141. See Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HARV. L. Pxv. 1268,
1274-81 (1959).
142. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957) (Norris-LaGuardia
does not prevent specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate).
143. Norris-LaGuardia's statutory language by prohibiting all injunctions in nonviolent
labor disputes, see note 33 supra and accompanying text, does not limit the act's protections
to the activities specified in § 4. Thus, the Senate Report stated, "The same rule through-
out the bill, wherever applicable, applies both to employers and employees." S. REP. No.
163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1932). Since § 4 specifies activities engaged in only by unions,
the scope of the act may not be limited to their protection without violating congressional
intent.
144. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1944) (concurring
opinion). Mr. Justice Murphy, although concurring in the result, rejected the majority
opinion because he wanted to state explicitly that the RLA would be unconstitutional with-
out incorporation of the Steele doctrine.
145. Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
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plenary jurisdiction over suits between unions and employers for violation of
contracts. 146 Prior to section 301, it was generally assumed that Norris-La-
Guardia protected strikes in breach of contract. 147 In 1932, legal enforceability
of labor contracts was not regarded as crucial to effective bargaining; indeed,
the prevailing philosophy, most clearly demonstrated by Norris-LaGuardia
itself, was that the law should play only a minimal role in labor relations. 4
Moreover, the legislative history and statutory language of Norris-LaGuardia
indicate a strong congressional desire to avoid judicially-created exceptions
to its broad prohibitions,149 and, since a strike in breach of contract is usually
a section 13 labor dispute involving activities protected by section 4, the act
seems to leave federal courts powerless to enjoin such conduct. But section
301's mandate to enforce collective agreements may compel relaxation of
Norris-LaGuardia's limitations. In Chicago River, the Supreme Court en-
joined a strike intended to evade the compulsory arbitration provisions of the
RLA, reasoning that policies of later legislation may take precedence over
Norris-LaGuardia. 150 Strikes in violation of the arbitration provisions of a
collective agreement might be analogous to the Chicago River situation, for,
if permitted, they might destroy the effectiveness of contractual arbitration.
Moreover, the establishment of a clear federal policy to protect and enforce
these contracts erases the danger that judges enjoining strikes in derogation
of contract provisions would be fashioning law according to their own views
of social policy.151 Indeed, the very prohibition against judicial lawmaking may
be inapplicable in contract actions, for section 301, as construed in Textile
146. Although § 301 is framed in jurisdictional terms, Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) held that the section authorized the creation of a
corpus of federal contract law to be fashioned "from the policy of our national labor laws."
147. Relevant pre-Taft-Hartley decisions indicated that Norris-LaGuardia barred in-
junctive relief against strikes in breach of contract, but their holdings are unclear. See
Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 27 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939);
Wilson Employees' Representation Plan v. Wilson & Co., 53 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Cal. 1943) ;
Colorado-Wyoming Express v. Denver Local 13, 35 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1940) ; Mores-
chi v. Mosteller, 28 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Pa. 1939).
The legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia also seems inconclusive. The issue was
raised only by those opposing the bill who stated that its provisions would prohibit injunc-
tions against stoppages violative of contract provisions. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1932) (statement of minority views) ; 75 CONG. REc. 5471 (1932) (remarks of
Representative Beck). Those who drafted and led the fight for passage remained mute on
this point.
But see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAWv 455-56 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
148. See note 30 supra; Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration,
30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 247, 253 (1958).
149. See note 45 supra.
150. 353 U.S. 30 (1957). See Cox, supra note 148, at 255.
151. See Teamsters v. Yellow Transit Lines, 46 L.R.R.M. 2915 (10th Cir. 1960). The
laissez faire philosophy of Norris-LaGuardia may be incompatible with § 301. It seems
clear that the section was intended to increase the sanctions against union conduct violative
of contract provisions, thus giving the law a broader role in the regulation of labor-man-
agement relations, See H.R. REP, No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947).
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Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 5 2 names the judiciary as a body of special
competence to make law in this area. 153 Thus, even though a section 301 in-
junction would not be surrounded by the procedural safeguards of other Taft-
Hartley injunctions, nor conditioned upon the exercise of discretion by other
governmental agencies, perhaps such restrictions are unnecessary when courts
act in contract matters. A final reason urged for allowing injunctive relief
relies on the Lincoln Mills holding that courts may specifically enforce the
employer's contractual promise to arbitrate grievances in spite of the anti-in-
junction statute.5 4 Denial of similar relief for breach of a no-strike clause-
labor's quid pro quo for management's acceptance of arbitration 155-would
seem incongruous.'r 6
The argument that the congressional intent expressed in Norris-LaGuardia
has been superceded by the basic policy of section 301 misconceives the prob-
lem, for, unlike the Chicago River situation, section 301 was passed with full
awareness of Norris-LaGuardia and the evils of labor injunctions. The primary
inquiry, therefore, must be directed to the specific intent of Congress when
Taft-Hartley was enacted. The legislative history of section 301 indicates that
this provision was not intended as a sub silentio authorization of injunctive
relief. The Senate version of the bill made breaches of collective agreements
unfair labor practices and gave the NLRB power under section 10 (j) to enjoin
violations.15 7 The House, on the other hand, gave jurisdiction over collective
agreements to the courts and explicitly authorized issuance of injunctions to
private parties. 55 The conference committee accepted this House version,
which became section 301, but eliminated the provision repealing Norris-La-
Guardia.'r 9 In view of Congress' explicitly stated belief that Norris-LaGuardia
forbade the enjoining of strikes in breach of contract, 160 and that Norris-La-
Guardia remained in force unless explicitly repealed, 16' omission of the in-
152. 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
153. Moreover, although the original Senate bill entrusted enforcement of collective
agreements to the NLRB by treating conduct in violation of a contract as an unfair labor
practice, S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(b) (5) (1947), the Conference Committee trans-
ferred responsibility to the courts through the medium of § 301, H. CONF. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 545-46, 569-70 (1947).
154. 353 U.S. 448 (1957) ; see text accompanying note 64 supra.
155. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; Textile Work-
ers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
156. Cox, supra note 150, at 252-56, see Teamsters v. Yellow Transit Lines, supra note
151.
157. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(b) (5) (1947).
158. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(e) (1947).
In actions and proceedings involving violations of agreements between an em-
ployer and a labor organization or other representative of employees, the provisions
of... [Norris-LaGuardia] shall not have any application in respect of either party.
159. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1947).
160. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947).
161. See 2 NLRB LEGISI.ATIVE HiSTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATION S ACT
OF 1947, at 1396 (1948) (debate between Senators Taft and Morse over § 303, a provision
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junction clause from section 301 indicates a refusal to allow injunctive re-
lief.10 2 Lower federal courts have generally adopted this position. 1 3
Admittedly, retention of Norris-LaGuardia in section 301 actions will render
judicial enforcement of that section's policy less effective. The threat of dam-
age actions, provided by section 301,16 may not curtail all strikes in deroga-
tion of arbitration; the union may decide that the value of the objective sought
outweighs the cost of damages.165 Nevertheless, the damage action would be
a deterrent in many cases, 166 and the congressional rejection of more effective
injunctive relief 137 seems to indicate satisfaction, or at least unwillingness, to
go beyond this method of enforcement.
Even if the legislative history did not contain evidence of a specific refusal
to allow injunctive relief, congressional awareness of the possibility that Nor-
analogous to § 301 in terms of the injunction problem, indicating that Senator Taft believed
that injunctions were not available without specific authorization). See also 2 id. at 1365.
162. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947) (stating that, after the
amendment to § 301 (e), only § 6 of Norris-LaGuardia is not applicable).
163. A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 932 (1957); W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, Local 25, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1954) ; In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Alcoa S.S. Co. v.
McMahon, 81 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd per curiam, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949) ; Sound Lumber Co. v. Local 2799, Lumber Workers,
122 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1954). Contra, Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Lines, 46
L.R.R.M. 2915 (10th Cir. 1960) ; American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tacoma Smeltermen's
Union, 175 F. Supp. 750 (W.D. Wash. 1959); Johnson & Johnson v. Textile Workers'
Union, 184 F. Supp. 359 (D.N.J. 1960).
164. Breach of a no-strike clause may be remedied by recovery of the accrued and an-
ticipated losses and lost profits resulting from the work stoppage. Teamsters Union, Local
25 v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956)
($359,000 damage award for breach of an "implied no-strike clause").
165. Also, the damage suit may not achieve the most desirous settlement of the dispute.
The statute does not specify the remedy but an injunction is the only practical
relief against a strike. Damages are inadequate because the injury to the business
cannot be measured accurately. Furthermore, an employer can rarely afford to ex-
acerbate labor-management relations by suing a union made up of his employees
after the end of the strike.
Cox, supra note 148, at 255.
166. In addition, Congress may have assumed that situations requiring injunctive relief
could be dealt with by state courts who are not affected by Norris-LaGuardia. After en-
actment of § 301, it has been held that that section does not bar state injunctive relief. Mc-
Carroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322
(1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). See text accompanying notes 175-83 infra.
Injunctive relief may also be available under NLRB doctrines holding strikes in deroga-
tion of arbitration procedures established by collective agreements to be an unfair labor
practice under § 8(b) (3), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1958). See Inter-
national Union, UMW (Boone County Coal Corp.), 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), enforcement
denied, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; UMW, Local 9735 (Westmoreland Coal Co.), 117
N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957), enforcement denied, 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958). But the Supreme
Court has cast some doubt on the validity of the NLRB's theory in these cases. See NLRB
v. Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 491 (1960).
167. See notes 157-59 supra and accompanying text.
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ris-LaGuardia might cripple enforcement of new policies, and the failure ex-
plicitly to resolve this conflict raise a strong presumption in favor of retaining
the injunction bar, despite its potentially harmful effect. Because of this aware-
ness, accommodation of Taft-Hartley with Norris-LaGuardia does not afford
the judiciary the same freedom to choose appropriate remedies that was neces-
sarily allowed under the Railway Labor Act, where absolutely no indication
of congressional preference for either of the conflicting policies can be found.
Moreover, authorizing strike injunctions in breach of contract suits would
raise again the danger of unfairness implicit in the hasty adjudication of tem-
porary injunction cases. While contract law presents a more precise standard
than the old common law of labor, doctrines created under section 301, arising
out of the labor-management struggle and colored by it, are likely to lack the
precision of principles derived from commercial contract law.1 8 The Supreme
Court has recently held that the common law of labor agreements cannot al-
ways be based upon traditional notions of contract. 169 Even direct application
of commercial precedents to the loosely-drawn, frequently ambiguous collective
agreements will present problems not amenable to hasty decision. For example,
under an agreement lacking a broad no-strike clause, a union's right to engage
in work stoppages may be governed by an "implied promise" not to strike over
arbitrable issues."70 The scope of the arbitration provision-a much-debated
question in the federal courts--cannot be resolved by reference to rules of
thumb but may be decided only after careful consideration of the complex
factors involved in construing collective agreements. 1
Nor does Lincoln Mills, by allowing specific enforcement of arbitration
clauses against management, create an imbalance requiring the same remedy
to be made available for violations of no-strike provisions; for the apparent
inequality of remedies is, in fact, a proper adjustment to the difference in the
tactical positions of management and labor when either refuses to arbitrate.
Injunctive relief against management's refusal is necessary because a damage
action for breach of the promise to submit to arbitration would furnish the
union only nominal relief." 2 But when the union strikes in refusing to arbi-
168. The Lincoln Mills decision made it quite clear that commercial contract law would
be no more than a guide and that the corpus of federal law governing § 301 actions was to
be fashioned through "judicial inventiveness" from "the policy of our national labor laws."
353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
169. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960) ; see United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay.
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
170. See, e.g., Local 25, Teamsters Union v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956) ; United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co.,
223 F2d 872, 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955) (dictum).
171. See authorities cited note 81 supra.
172. Arbitration agreements were denied specific enforcement at common law, and only
nominal damages were recoverable for their breach. IREsTATEmENT, CoNTRAcvs § 550
(1932) ; 6 WmLIsToN, CoNTRAcTs § 1919 (rev. ed. 1938).
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trate, the factor of strike losses makes the damage award a substantial deter-
rent-73 Moreover, this disparity apparently accords with the policy of Norris-
LaGuardia; section 8 encourages arbitration, while a strike is specifically
immunized from the injunction by section 4.174
State Courts, Section 301, and Norris-LaGuardia
If federal courts may not issue injunctions in section 301 actions, then state
courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction over suits for breach of collective
agreements may be bound by an identical rule. While the Supreme Court has
not yet ruled on the role of state courts under section 301, state courts have
held that their jurisdiction over labor contract actions is not preempted by
Taft-Hartley's provision for federal jurisdiction. In McCarroll v. Los Angeles
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, however, the California Supreme Court
concluded that state law must be subordinated to the federal law of labor con-
tracts, in order to avoid uncertainty and disparity of litigants' rights.175 As a
result state courts would be bound to follow, and to participate in formulating,
the federal common law of labor contracts. According to Lincoln Mills, for-
mulation of the federal common law must be governed by federal labor
policy.'.7 Since Norris-LaGuardia represents a part of the federal labor policy,
arguably state courts should be limited by Norris-LaGuardia when applying
federal law. The California court in McCarroll, however, rejected this thesis,
reasoning that neither Norris-LaGuardia nor section 301 were intended to
deprive state courts of their injunctive powers, and that state injunctive relief
would not affect the uniformity of litigants' rights.177 McCarroll's evaluation
of the legislative intent underlying both Norris-LaGuardia and section 301
seems correct. Norris-LaGuardia was directed only to federal courts.' 78 In
Taft-Hartley, Congress recognized the existence of state remedies when draft-
ing the act,1 79 and yet evinced no intention of affecting the enforcement powers
173. See note 165 supra.
174. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 8, 47 Stat. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1958) reads in
part: "No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has
failed . . . to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or
with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitra-
tion." But § 4(a), 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1958), prohibits absolutely
any decree enjoining persons involved in a labor dispute from "ceasing or refusing to per-
form any work or to remain in any relation of employment."
175. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) ; Karcz v.
Luther Mfg. Co., 338 Mass. 313, 155 N.E.2d 441 (1959); see Wellington, Labor and the
Federal System, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 542, 557-58 (1959).
176. 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
177. 49 Cal. 2d at 45, 315 P.2d at 330-33.
178. "[N]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction ... ." Norris-LaGuardia
Act § 1, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). Prior to Taft-Hartley, Norris-LaGuardia
had no impact on state tribunals. E.g., Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach, 279 N.Y. 323, 18 N.E.2d
294 (1938).
179. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1947).
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of state courts. Indeed, the enaction of section 301 reflects congressional desire
for greater, not lesser sanctions against breaches of contract. 80
Thus the decision in McCarroll may be challenged only by demonstrating
that the court erred in its assumption that injunctive relief would not affect
the uniformity of federal rights under section 301, and that this lack of uni-
formity must be eradicated. No doubt the presence or absence of strike in-
junctions will affect the content and meaning of a "no strike" clause; the
union's power to win disputes by striking in violation of the contract will be
severely curtailed if such strikes can be immediately enjoined. Thus there
exists a significant disparity between federal and state relief, which may affect
a substantive federal right. Once disparity is shown, however, it remains to
be proven that such disparity should be eradicated. Since Congress was aware
of the potentially greater severity of state remedies and did not attempt to
cure it, it cannot be argued that disparity offends a "policy" of uniformity
under Taft-Hartley. Perhaps correction would be warranted if, despite this
congressional inaction, it could be shown that the lack of uniform remedies
prevents achievement of Taft-Hartley's policy to encourage stable collective
agreements. But it does not. While the possibility of different interpretations
of the same substantive term might create uncertainty in the negotiation and
drafting of collective agreements, the possibility of injunctive relief can be
calculated by the parties in advance, particularly since the union knows that
management will seek such relief if it is available. 181 The final argument sug-
gested for rectifying disparity appeals to uniformity of result for its own sake,
based upon a reverse Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins theory which would impose
upon state courts enforcing federal rights the same duty to reach uniform
"outcomes" as is imposed upon federal courts enforcing state rights under
diversity jurisdiction.182 The analogy is misconceived, however. The uniform
180. Ibid.; see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1947).
The principal purpose of section 301 was to facilitate the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements by making unions suable as entities in the federal courts, and
thereby to remedy the one-sided character of existing labor legislation .... We would
give altogether too ironic a twist to this purpose if we held that the actual effect of
the legislation was to abolish in state courts equitable remedies that had been avail-
able, and leave an employer in a worse position in respect to the effective enforcement
of his contract than he was before enactment of section 301.
McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 63-64, 315
P.2d 322, 332 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) (Traynor, J.).
181. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315
P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) ; Wellington, supra note 175, at 559.
See also Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 489, 491
(1954).
182. Under Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts in diversity cases
must follow state law on all matters which will affect the outcome of litigation. See, e.g.,
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Since the "outcome-determinative" test
measures encroachment by the federal forum on state created rights, it should similarly
detect state interference with federally-created rights. And, since a federal court in diversity
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result demanded of federal courts rests upon the notion that the federal court
sitting in diversity cases promotes no independent federal interest,183 but is
merely another court of the state. State courts hearing labor contract actions,
on the other hand, may have an independent interest in labor relations, as
evidenced by the long history of state jurisdiction over labor contract matters,
and although the logical extension of Lincoln Mills would apparently require
uniformity, this state interest should not be lightly dismissed in the absence of
either specific congressional intent to the contrary, or outright conflict with
Taft-Hartley policy. Thus, even accepting the argument that state injunctive
relief sanctions disparate results, the disparity would not seem to require re-
jection of the McCarroll conclusion that state courts preserve their injunctive
power in section 301 suits.
RALPH K. WINTER, JR.t
must bow to state rules on all matters affecting the outcome of litigation, so state courts
enforcing contract rights under § 301 must yield to federal law on any matter that is "out-
come-determinative." See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction
over Labor Relations: I, 59 COLum. L. REv. 269, 280 (1959) ; Loeb, Accommodation of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act to Other Federal Statutes, 11 LAB. L.J. 473, 491 (1960).
183. See Bernardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (dictum).
tLL.B. 1960, Yale Law School.
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